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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs and appellants Bryce C. Reynolds and LaDonna Reynolds, 
claiming title to real property under a Tax Deed from the Salt Lake County 
Auditor, commenced an unlawful detainer action against defendant Stewart Van 
Wagoner. Plaintiff in intervention and respondent Richland, Inc. intervened in Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the case, claiming to be the owner of the property in question, and that tr,,. 
Deed was taken for its benefit pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Real Es:a: 
Contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On motion for summary judgment the District Court ruled thatc~: 
Tax Deed was taken for the benefit of plaintiff in intervention Richland, Inc 
and awarded the real property to it. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants Bryce C. Reynolds and LaDonna Reynolds ask the 
Supreme Court to reverse the judgment of the trial court and order the case 
tried on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was commenced by the filing of an unlawful detainer 
action by plaintiffs Bryce C . Reynolds and LaDonna Reynolds, his wife, aga:: 
defendant Stewart Van Wagoner (R. 2) . The Complaint alleges that plaintiffs;:: 
the fee title owners of the real property in question. Plaintiff in intervention 
Richland, Inc. was thereafter authorized to intervene in the case. Its Comp'.~: 
(R.19) asked the Court to hold the Tax Deed received by Reynolds from Sait:J 
County to be void, or alternatively for an Order requiring Reynolds to con?e'.J 
the property to Richland' Inc. By Counterclaim (R. 24) Reynolds asked that u.' I 
Court quiet title to the property in them. Answers to interrogatories (R · 33 .Z:' 
' ; " '1 
and answers to requests for admissions (R. 208) establish the following .cc'" : Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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On September 23, 1963, Bryce C. Reynolds, as an in di vi dual and 
as a debtor in possession and trustee in bankruptcy in a then pending Chapter 
XI proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, and 
Anna LaDonna Reynolds, his wife, executed ( 1) a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
wherein they were the sellers and Richland, Inc. was the buyer, (2) an Assign-
:nent to Motor Lease, Inc., (3) an Escrow Agreement, (4) a Quitclaim Deed and 
(5) a Trustee's Deed. All of the instruments were authorized by the Bankruptcy 
Court. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract (R .106) provided for a purchase 
price of $127,966.44, payable at the rate of $800.00 per month. Paragraph 14 of 
the Contract provided: 
In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of 
any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance pre-
miums as herein provided, ~~~is op_tion, pay 
said taxes, assessments and insuranceprem±ums or either of 
them, and if Seller elects so to do, then Buyer agrees to repay 
the Seller upon demariQ,afrs-ueh sums so advanced and paid 
by him together with interest thereon from the date of payment 
of said sums at the rate of 3/4 of one percent per month until 
paid. 
The Assignment assigned to Motor Lease, Inc. all sums due under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract. It specifically provided that the contract 
was not assigned, but that the assignors reserved all other rights and privileges 
and retained all duties and obligations they may have had under the Contract. 
The Escrow Agreement (R. 110) basically provided that payments 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract were to be made by Richland, Inc. to 
Motor Lease, Inc. through First Security Bank, the escrow agent. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The Quitclaim Deed (R.116) and the Trustee's Deed (R.118) 
the real property in question to Richland, Inc. 
Bryce C. Reynolds was later adjudged a bankrupt in the 1963 
bankruptcy proceeding, and the Reynolds thereafter vacated the property. 
Richland, Inc. has been in possession of the subject real property since at 
least 1968 (R. 93) . 
The real property taxes to Salt Lake County were not paid for tne 
years 1972 through 1975. Reynolds purchased the property for the delinquen: / 
taxes at the Auditor's tax sale and received an Auditor's Tax Deed on May 26. r/ 
1976 (R.217). 
I 
After hearing the motion for summary judgment, the District Ccur I 
said the following in a Memorandum Decision: 
Even though, as a practical matter, it appears that the Reynolds 
ended up in a position and as a result of the transactions of 
September, 1976, where they could realize nothing out of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and even if the Buyer Richland 
were to default thereunder, the fact remains that said contract 
did remain as an exi.siting "living" document and was such at 
the time Reynolds took the Tax Deed from Salt Lake County. Ti:a: I 
is, the contract was still in force and the escrow agent was not 
to deliver the escrow documents to the grantee Richland and 
until the $127, 966. 44 plus interest was paid in full. Although 
the Assignment of the contract proceeds to Motor Lease is of 
all amounts to be paid and is irrevocable, the last line of said 
Assignment makes clear that the contract is not assigned 
thereby, that the Reynolds have reserved to them "all other ngho 
and privileges and retained all duties and obligations they may 
have under said contract." Of course, one of these is the re-
quirement to perform as outlined in paragraph 14 of the Unilonr. 
Real Estate Contract. Since said Contract was still in force at 
the time the Reynolds bought the property at tax sale from Salt 
Lake County, the Reynolds are entitled to be fully repaid all 
sums they paid to Salt Lake County for the Tax Deed plus tM 
interest provided for in said paragraph 14 (up to the date JI Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
tender by Richland to the Clerk of Salt Lake County) and 
Richland is entitled to receive all interest acquired by the 
Reynolds in the tax sale of the property in question from Salt 
Lake County (R. 246) . 
Based upon the Memorandum Decision, the Court granted the motion 
for summary judgment, awarded the real property to Richland, Inc., awarded 
attorneys fees to Richland, Inc. and ordered that the Reynolds receive the amounts 
tendered into the Clerk of the Court by Richland, Inc. The appeal has been taken 
by the Reynolds only. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RICHLAND, INC. HAD ABANDONED REYNOLDS AS A 
PARTY TO THE CONTRACT, AND THE DISTRICT 
COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
REYNOLDS HAD RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER THE 
UNIFORM REAL EST ATE CONTRACT 
A contract is considered to remain in force until it is rescinded by 
mutual consent or until the opposite party acts inconsistent with the duty imposed 
upon him by the contract, which amounts to an abandonment. A contract will be 
treated as abandoned where the acts of one party, inconsistent with its existence, 
are acquiesced in by the other. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts Section 482. See also 
17 A C. J. S. , Contracts, Section 412. A Utah case in point is King vs. Firm, 
3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P. 2d 1114 ( 1955) where the court approved the foregoing rule. 
In the instant case, after the execution by Reynolds of the Assignment, 
Escrow Agreement, Quitclaim Deed and Trustee's Deed, they, as a practical matter, 
had no further interest in, or control of, the subject real property. They were not 
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in possession, they were not receiving the payments (in fact they had no wai 
knowing whether the payments were being made) and had no connection with 
the property whatsoever. As far as the parties to the various instruments wer' I 
I 
concerned, it no longer mattered whether Reynolds even existed. When Richlar. I 
Inc. completed its payments to Motor Lease, Inc., it would receive title without 
I 
any action of Reynolds. Richland, Inc. , therefore, had abandoned Reynolds d 
party to the contract, and looked only to Motor Lease, Inc. for preforrnance. I 
Reynolds, therefore, had no duties under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, ar.c I 
I 
were not acting for the benefit of anyone other than themselves when they pur· r 
chased the subject property at the tax sale. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE UTAH DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
CONVERSION REYNOLDS ASSIGNED TO RICHLAND, 
INC. ALL OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE UNIFORM 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
In Allred vs. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P. 2d 791 ( 1964) and 
In Re Estate of Wilson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P. 2d 1298 ( 1972) the Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted the theory of "equitable conversion." This doctrine is that 
an executory contract for the sale of real property, has the effect of converting 
the interest of the vendor to personalty -- the right to receive the payments 
from the vendee. This being the case, upon the assignment to Motor Lease, Inc 
th . left Bott' of the right to receive the payment, Reynolds had absolutely no mg · 
Motor Lease, Inc. and Richland, Inc. accepted the terms of that assignment, an: 
lll; 
acted accordingly. Reynolds thereafter had nothing to do with the propertY 
1. 
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therefore, had no rights or duties under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the decision of the District Court and 
remand the case for trial on the other issues of fact and law raised in the 
pleadings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John H. Allen 
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorney for Appellants 
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